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STOCK OPTION BACKDATING: IS THE
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE ENOUGH TO
ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM OR IS IT STILL A
WORK IN PROGRESS?
Lara E. Muller*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, anyone who read the Wall Street Journal was
certainly aware that the "scandal du jour" involved the
backdating of employee stock-options grants.' Employee
stock options provide employees with a contractual right to
buy the company's stock at the current market price at a time
in the future.2 The value of the option "lies in the prospect
that the market price of the company's stock will increase."3
In an attempt to boost the value of options to employees, and
to allow employees to realize an immediate gain, many
companies backdate the grant date to a point in time when
the fair value of the company's stock was lower than its
current market value.' In most cases, the practice of
backdating stock options is problematic because it results in
understated compensation expense and overstated earnings
* Managing Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 51; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law, May 2011; LLB Bachelor of Laws,
University of Reading, England, July 2005. I would like to thank the Santa
Clara Law Review Board of Editors and Associates for their contributions to my
comment. I would also like to thank Professor Rachel H. Smith for all her
advice and enthusiasm during the research and drafting stages. Finally, I want
to express my sincere appreciation to my family and friends for their ongoing
support.
1. Mitchell Kaufman, Stock-Options Grants: Open Business Practices Key
to Compliance, in ANDREWS SPECIAL REPORT, STOCK-OPTIONS BACKDATING &
EXECUTiVE COMPENSATION 45, 45 (Phyllis Lipka Skupien & Frank Reynolds
eds., 2006).
2. JAMES M. BICKLEY & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33926,
STOCK OPTIONS: THE BACKDATING ISSUE 1 (2008).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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per share on companies' income statements.5
In May 2005, Professor Erik Lie published a study that
identified this practice and "unleashed a firestorm of
controversy in the investment community."' Although the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had
investigated a few isolated instances of backdating, Lie's
study was the first indication of a more pervasive backdating
phenomenon.' Lie's publication did not mention any
companies by name, but in March 2006, the Wall Street
Journal published an article drawing widespread public
attention to the issue and identifying several companies with
"highly suspicious granting practices."' Subsequently, the
SEC launched more than 140 investigations,' and it enacted
new compensation disclosure rules spawning more interest
and comments than any other regulations in the SEC's
seventy-two year history.'0
Currently, backdating is not illegal unless a company
fails to disclose the backdated grant as a compensation
expense in its financial statements." Such a failure may
constitute a violation of securities laws, accounting rules, and
tax laws.' 2 Nevertheless, companies continue to backdate
options without disclosing the activity.' 3  Thus, it appears
that the current regulations have not, and likely will not,
eliminate the problem." In addition to the violations of the
aforementioned laws, backdating also harms shareholders in
5. See AMPER, POLITZINER & MATTIA, TIMING OF STOCK OPTIONS 1 (July
2006), http://www.amper.com/PDFfiles 128906/Stock-OptionWhitePaper.pdf
[hereinafter TIMING OF STOCK OPTIONS].
6. See John D. Shipman, The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the
Wake of SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1194,
1203-04 (2007).
7. Id. at 1204.
8. Steve Stecklow, Options Study Becomes Required Reading, WALL ST. J.,
May 30, 2006, at B1 (discussing the response to Erik Lie's publication).
9. Mark Maremont, Backdating Likely More Widespread, WALL ST. J., Aug.
18, 2009, at Cl (discussing the results of the recent study conducted by Scott
Whisenant and Rick Edelson, researchers at the University of Houston's C.T.
Bauer College of Business). The SEC investigations included many of the
companies named in the Wall Street Journal article. See BIcKLEY & SHORTER,
supra note 2, at 31.
10. Shipman, supra note 6, at 1196-97.
11. See BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 32.
14. See id.
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several ways." Given the pervasive use of backdating and
the attendant harm to. shareholders, the issue merits an
analysis of the deficiencies in the current regulatory and
enforcement schemes. Further, the issue warrants a
discussion of various solutions that might put a much needed
end to the backdating scandal.
First, this comment will discuss the characteristics of a
stock option and the reasons why companies engage in the
practice of backdating. 1 6 Second, this comment will discuss
the current state of the law regarding stock option backdating
and the governmental response to the issue." Third, this
comment will discuss the problems with the existing
regulations." Finally, this comment will propose additional
regulations that will increase awareness of the backdating
problem, will promote self-regulation, and will circumvent
SEC resource issues.' 9
II. STOCK OPTIONS AND THE BACKDATING ISSUE
A. What Are Stock Options?
Employee stock options give employees a contractual
right to buy a company's common stock at a specified exercise
price, and in accordance with certain vesting provisions.2 0
The exercise price is usually the fair market value of the
company's common stock at the time of the grant, with the
underlying incentive that the fair market value of the stock
should increase at some point in the future.2 ' Vesting
provisions allow "a corporation to sell stock to an employee in
the future at today's price . . . to encourage continued
employment."22 Thus, stock options are used by companies to
15. See TIMING OF STOCK OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 1. For example, if the
backdating is discovered, the lack of disclosure can lead to costly financial
restatements and litigation, which in turn reduces the shareholder value. See
id.
16. See infra Part IIA-B.
17. See infra Part II.C-G.
18. See infra Part III-IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 1.
21. Id.
22. Lionel M. Allan, Ronald C. Caruth & John J. Clair, Jr., Equity
Incentives For Start-Up Companies, in ADVANCED BUSINESS LAW SERIES,
PROGRAM MATERIAL, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985, at 5, 19 (Cal. Continuing Educ.
of the Bar, 1985).
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"compete for the services of scarce employees; . . . [to]
discourage existing employees from changing employment;
and . . . [to] encourage employees to make extra efforts on
behalf of the corporation with the goal of increasing the value
of the corporation's stock.""
In connection with the stock market boom of the 1990s,
the grant of stock options as a means of compensating
employees increased dramatically.2 4  Additionally, various
legislative and accounting rule changes affected granting
patterns. 25  First, although 1993 legislation capped a public
company's compensation deduction for its top executives at
one million dollars, performance based compensation was
excluded from this amount.2 6 Thus, stock options allowed a
company to provide competitive compensation to its
executives, while at the same time, avoiding certain tax
liabilities." Second, there was no obligation to report stock
options as a cost on the company's financial statements,
resulting in stock option grants that had no impact on
reported earnings. 28  Third, as marginal tax rates were
increased in 1993, it "gave an incentive to individuals to
receive forms of remuneration that would be taxed at a lower
rate."2 9 More specifically, gains on certain stock options were,
and still remain, subject to the lower long term capital gains
rates.30
23. Id. at 5.
24. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 6.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 6-7. See also I.R.C. § 162(m) (2002).
27. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 6-7.
28. Id. at 8. In 2004, however, a new accounting rule was adopted, "which
requires public companies to incorporate the estimated value of their option
grants as a cost in their financial disclosures." Id. at 8 n.22; SHARE-BASED
PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd., revised 2004). This requirement has resulted in a decrease in
option grants. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 8 n.22. It has been argued
that if this law had faced less opposition at the outset and had been adopted in
the 1990s, it is possible that the executive compensation problems that have
developed would not have been so severe. Id. at 8; see also infra Part II.D
(discussing FAS 123(R)).
29. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 6.
30. Id. at 5. Gains on stock issued pursuant to a stock option are taxed at
the long term capital gains rate if the stock is held for one year following the
exercise date and two years from the date of grant. Id.
334 [Vol:51
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B. What Is Backdating?
Stock options are normally granted with "an exercise
price that equals the current price of the stock at the time of
grant.""' Backdating occurs when the company sets "a grant
date that precedes the actual date of the corporate action" to
give the stock option a lower exercise price and a higher
value.32 When the exercise price is lower than the fair
market value at the time of grant, an option is said to be "in-
the-money."3 3  Academic studies show that the practice of
backdating has been very widespread in the last two
decades.3 4 One study examining grant activity between 1996
and 2005 estimated that twenty-nine percent of the sample
companies had engaged in the backdating of executive stock
options during that time span.
Many companies view backdating stock options as an
acceptable practice, because these companies "desire to keep
the price of their common shares low . . . to make stock
incentives more attractive to their employees."3 Without
backdating, this is not easy for a public company, with little
control over its market value, to achieve.3 ' Another reason a
31. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 47.
32. Id. The higher value results from manipulating the timing of the option
in such a way that it is already in-the-money immediately upon grant,
increasing potential gain to the recipient. See id. There are several forms of
timing manipulation that can be problematic. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note
2, at 28. Sometimes, option grant dates are changed retroactively to fall upon a
date when the company's stock was at its lowest price over a period of time. Id.
at 1. Other times, option grants are timed around company announcements.
Spring-loading occurs when options are granted prior to positive public
announcements and a price boost is anticipated. Id. at 28. Conversely, bullet-
dodging occurs when options are granted after a negative public announcement
and a price drop is anticipated. Id. Another form of timing manipulation occurs
when announcements are timed around scheduled grant dates. Id. A final form
of timing manipulation occurs when option exercise dates are changed to
increase the holding period and qualify any gain upon sale for capital gains
treatment. Id. This comment will only discuss the first of these forms of timing
manipulation, as this is the form that has been subject to the most amount of
scrutiny since 2005. See id. at 28 n.87.
33. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 1. When the exercise price is
equal to the market price, an option is said to be "at-the-money." Id. When the
exercise price is more than the market price, the option is "out-of-the-money."
Id.
34. See id. at 9.
35. Id.
36. Allan et al., supra note 22, at 24.
37. Jill Andresky Fraser, Private Company Stock, INC. (May 1, 2000),
http//www.inc.com/magazine/20000501/18710.html. But this might explain
2011]1 335
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company may choose to backdate is that because there is a
guaranteed gain attached to the option, the company can
therefore grant a smaller number of option shares to an
employee without reducing the underlying economic
incentive. Consequently, this also means that backdating
reduces the risk of dilution to existing stockholders because
the company can reduce the number of shares that underlie
the options.
Stock option backdating has been particularly
concentrated in the technology sector, 0 most likely because
this area consists of many companies with volatile stock
prices.4 In addition, "[sitock options started as a method for
luring scarce technical talent to take a chance on the future
rewards from a risky start-up."4 2 In the late 1990s, when the
technology boom was near its peak, "talent became even
scarcer, prompting companies to look for ways to increase the
value of the reward . . . . [and] [blackdating options became
the solution."4 3  Usually, leaders of these technology
companies "[were] rule-breakers to start with," sought to
"think outside the box," and generally paid little attention to
the "details of running a business."" Furthermore, in many
cases, these companies' financial officers and attorneys were
not advising against these practices because they were
unaware that failure to disclose the practice was illegal.4 5
Nevertheless, not all backdating is problematic."
why private companies, with more control over their stock price, have stayed
out of the spotlight in recent backdating investigations when many public
companies have not. How Backdating Stock Option Grants Could Create Future
Problems for Private Companies Too, CLIENT ALERT (Ulmer Berne,
LLP, Cleveland, Ohio), August 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.ulmer.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/ClientAlerts/BackdatingStockO
ptionsAugust2006.pdf [hereinafter Ulmer Berne].
38. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 46.
39. Id.
40. Shipman, supra note 6, at 1205.
41. Id.
42. Stephen P. Mader, Options backdating trips up whiz kids, CNET NEWS
(Mar. 9, 2007), http//news.cnet.com/Options-backdating-trips-up-whiz-
kids/2010-1014_3-6165894.html.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. This confusion may have been caused by the initial failure of the
SEC to address or take a firm position on the legality of backdating. Shipman,
supra note 6, at 1215.
46. See generally Patrick Richard, Bryan Barnhart & Krystal LoPilato,
Backdating Is Not Always Fraudulent: How to Distinguish Between Lawful and
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Backdating "has long been [used as] a common and useful
corporate-housekeeping tool" to give retroactive effect to
directorial resolutions. 7 This type of backdating is more
suitably called "ratification" and is an "appropriate practice,"
so long as the required procedures are followed and the
proper disclosures are made.48 Since the unearthing of the
scandal in 2005, the government's main concern has not been
with "the propriety of backdating," but has instead been
focused on the directors and officers who used improper
retroactive resolutions to commit fraud.49  The question has
not been what was done, but why.so Backdating alone is not
illegal. But when it is accompanied by fraud, or a purpose
that can only be achieved by non-disclosure, such as giving
employees compensation that does not have to be reported to
the regulators or the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), it
becomes problematic.,"
C. The Discovery of the Scandal
In 2005, the practice of undisclosed backdating was
discovered,52 and subsequently generated an investigatory
response by various governmental agencies." Yet, it was not
the SEC that actually discovered this pattern of granting
behavior. It was Professor Erik Lie, publishing an academic
study in 2005, who first revealed the pervasive use of
unreported backdating.5 4 In his research, Lie noticed that
many executive grants were conveniently timed to coincide
with a stock's low value point." He noted that the "abnormal
Fraudulent Ratification, in ANDREWS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see, e.g., Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Belcher, 4 Cal. 2d 268, 272,
275-76 (1935) (holding that a director who was absent during a board vote may
ratify the action at a later time); Kalageorgi v. Kamkin, 750 A.2d 531, 540 (Del.
1999) (permitting a board to use ratification to authorize a grant of stock shares
to the directors themselves, effectively backdating the stock grants by almost
ten years).
49. Richard et al., supra note 46, at 9.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 12.
52. See Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT.
SCI. 802 (May 2005) (discussing the findings of his study that suggest many
executive option grants are retroactively timed).
53. See infra Part II.E-F.
54. See generally Lie, supra note 52. Erik Lie is a Professor of Finance at
the University of Iowa. See Stecklow, supra note 8.
55. Lie, supra note 52, at 810.
2011] 337
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stock returns [were] negative before unscheduled executive
option awards and positive afterwards."5 6 Previously,
scholars had hypothesized that these option grants were
timed in advance of expected price boosts or positive news
releases." Lie predicted, however, that these awards were
"timed ex post facto" because executives' are positioned
within a company to have a superior ability to forecast a stock
price's exact response to business developments.58
Furthermore, Lie noted that the backdating patterns
appeared to be absent for grants that were scheduled in
advance and, thus, believed that the "manipulation of the
information flow played, at best, a minor role" in justifying
the patterns.
Prior to publication, Lie sent a copy of his article to the
SEC and "later received an acknowledgement stating it was
interesting."60 His article did not cite any companies by
name, but it did trigger a Wall Street Journal article that
used statistical analysis to identify companies with suspicious
granting patterns.6 ' Following exposure in the Wall Street
Journal article, "the scandal gained wide public attention."62
D. The Problems Associated with Backdating Prior to the
Discovery of the Scandal
Before the scandal erupted in 2005, there were several
indirect mechanisms in place to protect shareholders against
the risks of backdating and to penalize the actors involved in
the backdating transaction. These risks included economic
consequences of tax, accounting, and legal issues."
Under the Internal Revenue Code, stock options issued
below fair market value are not exempt for purposes of the
one million dollar executive compensation deduction cap
56. Id. at 802.
57. Id. at 810. This is also referred to as spring-loading. See supra note 32
and accompanying text.
58. Lie, supra note 52, at 810.
59. Randall Heron & Erik Lie, Stock-Option Backdating: Where Are We
Now? An Update From the Authors of the Research That Uncovered the Practice,
in ANDREWS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 4.
60. Stecklow, supra note 8.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The
Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1597, 1600 (June 2007).
[Vol:51338
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under section 162.6 Furthermore, if these options are issued
below the fair market value, the difference between the
exercise price and the fair market value is taxable at the
ordinary income rate instead of the preferential long-term
capital gains rate." Additionally, if the backdated stock
options are viewed as "nonqualified deferred compensation,"
there could be additional personal tax liabilities.6 ' These
liabilities arose when the government adopted section 409A of
the Internal Revenue Code as part of the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, as a response to concerns regarding
executive compensation abuses and rising corporate
scandals. Under section 409A, nonqualified deferred
compensation in the form of in-the-money stock options
vesting after December 31, 2004 are subject to tax at the time
of vesting, instead of at the time of exercise.6 9 Even though
section 409A was not aimed specifically at the problem of
backdating, given its position within the scandal's timeline, it
could have reduced the practice significantly.70 Moreover, the
"provision applies to all companies, not just publicly traded
ones, which makes compliance . . . a concern for all
businesses.""
In addition to these tax provisions, backdating also
violates an accounting principle.7 2 Under the Financial
64. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also I.R.C. § 162(m)
(2002).
65. Allan et al., supra note 22, at 12-13.
66. Nonqualified deferred compensation is compensation that is earned, but
there is a delay in "the receipt of compensation and taxes on compensation to a
future tax year." BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 13. Most stock options
are considered "nonqualified deferred compensation" under the tax code as long
as they are granted at fair market value. William B. Mateja & Lezlie B. Willis,
Backdating Stock Options: In the Money and Under Investigation, What the
Government is Doing and What You Should Do in Response, in ANDREWS
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 19, 23.
67. TIMING OF STOCK OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 1. These tax liabilities
include "regular tax plus an additional 20 percent income tax to the option
recipient on the date of option vesting," instead of the date of exercise or sale,
plus interest. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 47.
68. I.R.C. § 409A (West Supp. 2005); see also BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra
note 2, at 13.
69. Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1620-22 (explaining the implications
of section 409A as an exception to the regular tax rules relating to deferred
compensation).
70. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 12.
71. Mateja & Willis, supra note 66, at 23.
72. See Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1623-24.
2011] 339
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Accounting Standard 123(R),7 3 employee stock options must
be expensed at the fair market value as of the date of grant.74
Thus, backdating may result in "understated compensation
expense and overstated earnings per share on the income
statement. . . [and] could potentially require restatement.""
Backdating triggers several additional legal issues."
When options are backdated, "shareholders may be misled
into believing that management's interests are firmly aligned
with theirs . . . when in fact executives can receive additional
compensation without stock prices rising," resulting in extra
compensation expense." Without full disclosure of these
granting practices to the shareholders, it is "misleading to
certify the financial statements as compliant" with accepted
standards," and it is certainly inconsistent with the purposes
of federal securities laws." Backdating without proper
disclosure runs contrary to executives' "fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty" to the corporation and its shareholders."0
Additionally, securities laws provide that it is unlawful for a
73. SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No.
123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., revised 2004).
74. See Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1623. This rule became effective
in 2005 replacing the previous requirement that companies merely report the
fair market value of option grants in the footnotes to the financial statements.
Id.
75. TIMING OF STOCK OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 1. When a company grants
stock options with a discounted exercise price, the difference between the
exercise price and the fair market value is treated as "camouflaged pay." See
Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1600. Consequently, the companies'
compensation expense is understated when the backdated options are
undisclosed because the company has failed to record that amount as a
compensation expense on its financial statements. See id. at 1606. Similarly,
the companies' earnings are inflated because companies are required to
'subtract the expense of the estimated value of their option grants from their
earnings." BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 13. If the company's
compensation expense and earnings are inaccurate and are not restated,
shareholders making an investment decision might be misled with respect to
the company's financial condition. See Mateja & Willis, supra note 66, at 21.
76. See Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1606-07.
77. Id. at 1606.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1606 n.39-40 (noting that the purpose of these laws was to
promote full and fair disclosure and to better protect investors).
80. Id. at 1615. The duty of care is only discharged if the backdating is
disclosed and approved by an independent committee of the board. Id. at 1616.
The duty of loyalty requires that fiduciaries not "personally profit at the
expense of the company." Id. at 1617 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 520 (Del.
1939)).
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person engaging in the sale of securities to use manipulative
or deceptive devices.8 1 This makes it unlawful for any person
to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or
"make any untrue statement of a material fact."82
Backdating of options "appear [s] by [its] nature to fall within
the current standards for material misrepresentation.""
In late July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act went into
effect and reduced the filing deadlines for reporting option
grants to regulators on Form 4 from forty-five days to two
days. 4 Thus, any option that is backdated by more than two
days also violates Sarbanes-Oxley.ss This Act was passed as
a response to major corporate and accounting scandals, such
as Enron, and was designed to boost the public's confidence in
the market by enhancing the corporate accounting controls.8 6
A subsequent study by Erik Lie showed that the newly
implemented, more stringent filing deadline imposed by this
legislation substantially curtailed backdating, yet it did not
eliminate it completely.87  Lie demonstrated that "when
81. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
82. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2007).
83. Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1607-09 (noting that to determine
materiality, the courts consider factors such as whether disclosure would affect
the stock price or if there is a likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider the fact important in making an investment decision).
84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see also BICKLEY &
SHORTER, supra note 2, at 14.
85. See BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 14.
86. John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and
the International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 216 (2003).
In 2000, Enron was a very successful "high-tech global enterprise," and with
revenues exceeding $100 billion, it was the "seventh largest company by market
capitalization of the Fortune 500." Marlene A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The
Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2003). In October 2001,
however, Enron astounded "Wall Street by revealing a $544 million charge to
earnings and a $1.2 billion reduction of shareholder equity." Id. This was a
result of related party transactions that allowed Enron to inflate its earnings for
five years and keep its liabilities off the balance sheets. Id. at 1234. Shortly
thereafter, the market lost confidence in the company and Enron was forced to
file bankruptcy. Id. Shareholders lost billions of dollars and "thousands of
employees lost their jobs and retirement savings." Id. This "debacle [was] one
of the United States' most disastrous business failures." Id. at 1233.
87. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 32; see also Randall A. Heron &
Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive
Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 280 (February 2007) [hereinafter
Heron & Lie 2007] (discussing the effect that Sarbanes-Oxley had on
backdating).
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companies reported options the same day they were granted,
there was no pattern of share prices quickly rising.""8
Nevertheless, "the pattern continued when companies
delayed reporting option grants."" Lie concluded that to
eradicate backdating, "the requirements needled] to be
tightened further" and needed to be strictly enforced.90
E. Responding to the Discovery of the Backdating Scandal
In response to the discovery of the scandal, the
government adopted various new rules and regulations, on
top of the existing mechanisms, in an attempt to swiftly
control the problem.' In July 2006, the SEC adopted
changes to the executive compensation public company
reporting requirements.92 The new rules require companies
to disclose the fair value of the stock on the date of grant, the
closing market price if it is higher than the fair value, and the
date the board or committee met to grant the option, if it is
different from the grant date.93 In addition, the new rules
require disclosure of the "methodology used to determine the
exercise price if . .. [it] is not the closing price per share on
the grant date."94  The company must also disclose
information about its granting policies, including why it picks
"certain dates for awarding stock options and how it
determines the exercise price."s
In July 2006, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB") issued an audit practice alert in response to
the backdating problem.9" The alert recommended that
88. See Stecklow, supra note 8.
89. Id.
90. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 32.
91. Mateja & Willis, supra note 66, at 23.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Companies must now be prepared to answer questions such as:
Does [the] company have a program to time option grants in
coordination with the release of material, nonpublic information? How
does the company's plan for granting options to executives fit in with
its plan for granting options to employees? What role did the
compensation committee have in making the grant? What role did the
executive officers have in the company's timing for granting options?
Id. at 24.
96. Id. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was created by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is a "private corporation under the SEC's
jurisdiction." Id.
342 [Vol:51
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auditors and their clients become more diligent in their
disclosure of backdated options." As a result of the audit
practice report, companies are almost forced to self-regulate
and self-investigate to avoid the issuance of an unfavorable
auditors' report."
In addition to these preventive steps, the SEC and
Department of Justice ("DOJ") launched investigations into
the option granting procedures of various public companies,
such as Brocade Communications Systems, Inc., Comverse
Technology, Inc., and Apple, Inc." In July 2006, the IRS also
announced that it intended to investigate tax code violations
by companies that were already under scrutiny.'00 Notably,
backdating is not problematic or illegal unless the corporation
fails to comply with securities laws, tax laws, and public
company disclosure requirements or accounting procedures.'o
Therefore, the investigations have focused on these secondary
issues.o' Similarly, the regulatory responses discussed above
were geared towards enhanced disclosure and were not aimed
directly at proscribing backdating.0 3
In its 2006 investigations, the SEC looked for
overstatements of earnings and understatements of expenses
that might mislead investors with regard to the health of the
company.104  If misstatements were present, then a
restatement was required. 0 ' Restatements of financials can
be time consuming, expensive, and can sometimes lead to
delinquency in subsequent reporting obligations.106
Misstatements can also lead to charges of fraud or insider
97. Mateja & Willis, supra note 66, at 24.
98. Id.
99. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 45.
100. See Mark J. Rochon & Andrew T. Wise, How to Prepare for Stock-Option
Backdating Investigations, in ANDREWS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
101. See Kaufman, supra note 1, at 47-48. In fact, several S.E.C.
commissioners have opined that properly disclosed option grants are legal even
if backdated. Id. at 48,
102. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Reyes, 491 F. Supp. 2d 906, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(alleging fraud and misstatements in connection with the sale of securities,
failures in internal controls, falsification of books and records, fraudulent
entries into the company's financial records, and false and misleading
statements to outside auditors).
103. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text; infra Part II.F.
104. See Mateja & Willis, supra note 66, at 21.
105. See id.
106. Id.
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trading, '0 7 and false certification with respect to the accuracy
of the financials or disclosures in SEC filings. 0 8  The DOJ
also investigated related criminal activities,'09  and
subsequently filed indictments alleging forgery of corporate
records to cover up the backdating," 0 conspiracy,"' mail and
wire fraud,112 and willful violation of the provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1" The IRS looked for
activity that should have triggered or accelerated tax liability,
such as incorrect exemption of in-the-money grants from the
one million dollar compensation cap or nonqualified deferred
compensation granted below fair market value.114  Federal
authorities in Northern California also formed a Bay Area
Federal Task Force to investigate the issues on a local level
because the region is home to "America's leading high-tech
107. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2007).
108. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (West Supp. 2009)
(requiring the chief executive or financial officer to certify the accuracy of
disclosures); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (West Supp.
2009) (providing criminal penalties for failure to certify financial reports).
These omissions could also give rise to liability under the "financial reporting,
books-and-records, and internal control provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Sections 13(a) and 13(b)." Kaufman, supra note 1, at 48. In turn,
this could trigger violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of
1933. Id.
109. It is unclear when backdating will give rise to criminal penalties as
well as, or instead of, civil penalties. See John K. Villa, In-house
Counsel and Backdating: What Will They Criminalize Next?, ACC
DOCKET, January/February 2008, at 74, 80-81, available at
http://www.wc.com/assets/attachments/in-house-counselandbackdating.pdf.
It probably depends on "the strength of the evidence supporting the
government's allegations of knowledge of wrongdoing or scienter." Id. at 81.
This is because "[ilt is one thing to allege that the general counsel knew or
should have known (or was reckless in not knowing), and another to prove
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. However, it is possible that the
"cases where the practice was open and notorious . . . are more likely to reflect
lack of scienter because of ignorance of the rules than those where elaborate
cover-ups were developed." Id.
110. See Brocade-Indictment, in ANDREWS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1,
at § A (charging the Chief Executive Officer and Vice President of Human
Resources with forgery of minutes to make it look like the compensation
committee had met on the backdated grant date and backdating of employment
agreements so that employees could receive grants on an earlier date).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Richard E. Wood & Michael J. Missal, The SEC's New Executive
Compensation Disclosure Rules: Liability Concerns For Officers and Directors,
in ANDREWS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 37, 43.
114. See Mateja & Willis, supra note 66, at 22-23.
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firms and other publicly traded internet businesses."115
In addition to the government actions, private litigants,
such as shareholders and employees, have brought class
action and derivative suitS.116 The suits attempted to recover
costs caused by earning hits, reduced executive performance
because of the diminished incentives, delisting when the
company becomes delinquent on its reporting obligations,
additional tax liabilities, and legal fees."' The prospect of
multiple lawsuits can seriously threaten the longevity of a
company."18  More generally, these investigations, and the
process of restating a companies' financials, can give rise to a
finding of a material weakness in a company's internal
controls. This display of weakness can lead to a further drop
in the company's stock value, defeating the entire purpose of
backdating. "I
F. A Few Examples of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Investigations
After discovering the scandal, the SEC launched
investigations into more than 140 companies.1 2 0 One of the
earliest backdating cases materialized from the investigation
into Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.'21 The SEC and
DOJ filed criminal and civil charges against the executives at
Brocade in July 2006.122
The civil complaint alleged "fraud and misstatements in
connection with the sale of securities[,] . . . failures of internal
controls and the falsification of books and records." 2 3 These
allegations were supported by factual descriptions of how
records had been altered by executives to make options look
like they were granted at an earlier date.12 4 Furthermore, the
SEC and DOJ alleged that the executives had made
115. Bay Area Federal Task Force Targets Options Backdating, in ANDREWS
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
116. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 9-12 (describing the costs to
shareholders and employees that result from backdating).
117. Id.
118. See Mateja & Willis, supra note 66, at 22.
119. Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1623-24.
120. See Maremont, supra note 9.
121. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 2.
122. Rochon & Wise, supra note 100, at 29.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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"fraudulent entries into the company's financial records" and
that "false and misleading statements [were made] to outside
auditors in order to conceal these acts." 2 5 The parties
eventually settled this action without admitting or denying
any of the allegations. 26
The criminal complaint alleged similar acts but also
"charge[d] that the defendants committed securities fraud by
using the mail and the national securities exchanges to
promote a scheme [and conspiracy] that violated provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934."127 Brocade's Chief Executive Officer, Gregory Reyes,
and Vice-President of Human Resources, Stephanie Jensen,
were both sentenced to imprisonment.128 On appeal, Reyes's
conviction was reversed as a result of prosecutorial
misconduct; however, he was found guilty for a second time at
the retrial and was subsequently sentenced to eighteen
months in prison. 2 9 Jensen's sentence was vacated because
it improperly included an obstruction of justice enhancement;
nevertheless, she still faced two months in prison after
resentencing. 3 1
In addition to the proceedings initiated by the SEC and
DOJ, Brocade's shareholders brought a derivative suit on
behalf of the company against Reyes for breach of his
fiduciary duties.a13  In August 2007, the SEC also brought
another civil action against Brocade's former Chief Financial
Officer, Michael Byrd, "alleging that he [had] disregarded
125. Id.
126. See Litigation Release No. 20989, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Court
Enters Final Judgments Settling Actions Against Defendants Antonio
Canova and Stephanie Jensen (Apr. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20989.htm.
127. Rochon & Wise, supra note 100, at 30.
128. See U.S. v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 2009).
129. See id. at 1073; U.S. v. Reyes, No. CR 06-0556-1 CRB, 2010 WL
1623969, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010); Nathan Koppel, Brocade's Gregory
Reyes Sentenced (Again) For Options Backdating, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 25,
2010 10:31 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/lawl2010/06/25/brocades-gregory-reyes-
sentenced-again-for-options-backdating/.
130. See Reyes, 577 F.3d at 1073; Amanda Bronstad, Prosecution in KB Home
Backdating Case Takes a New Tack: Personal Gain, LAW.COM (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=1202445793620.
131. See Karen Gullo, Ex-Brocade Chief to Pay $12.5 Million to
Settle Backdating Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a.FGXFcEx8hg. This
action was recently settled for $12.5 million. Id.
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indications that other senior corporate executives were
improperly backdating" and that he "failed to ensure that the
company properly accounted for the option expenses and
disclosed them to investors." 3 2
The Brocade investigation and proceedings exemplify the
heavy factual nature of all option backdating investigations,
and the potential for civil as well as criminal penalties. 3 3
Furthermore, it shows that the SEC will pursue corporate
gatekeepers who observe the activity, such as Byrd, as well as
those who actually commit the fraud.134
The case against Apple, Inc. provides a good illustration
of the settlement procedures that can operate in backdating
cases. In April 2007, the SEC charged Apple's former
General Counsel, Nancy Heinen, and the Chief Financial
Officer, Fred Anderson, with backdating executive grants and
altering the company records to conceal the fraud. 35  Both
Heinen and Anderson were alleged to have personally
received millions of dollars in unreported compensation. 136 As
a result, both were charged with numerous violations of the
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, but no criminal charges were filed.' 37
Heinen and Anderson both settled with the SEC, received
civil penalties, and had to pay all taxes, penalties, and
interest on the unreported compensation they received. 38 In
addition, Heinen was enjoined from any future violations and
was barred from serving as an officer or director of any public
company for five years. 3 9  Anderson also agreed to a
132. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Additional
Brocade Executive for Role in Stock Option Backdating Scheme (Aug. 17, 2007),
available at httpJ//www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-166.htm.
133. See Rochon & Wise, supra note 100, at 29-30.
134. See Press Release, supra note 132.
135. Litigation Release No. 20086, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
SEC Charges Former Apple General Counsel for Illegal Stock
Option Backdating; Commission Also Settles Claims Against Former
Apple CFO for $3.5 Million (Apr. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleases/2007/lr20086.htm; Litigation Release
No. 20683, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Settles Options Backdating
Charges With Former Apple General Counsel For $2.2 Million (Aug. 14, 2008),
available at http//www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20683.htm.
136. Litigation Release No. 20086, supra note 135.
137. See id.; Litigation Release No. 20683, supra note 135.
138. See Litigation Release No. 20086, supra note 135; Litigation Release No.
20683, supra note 135.
139. Litigation Release No. 20683, supra note 135.
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permanent injunction from further violations of the Securities
Act and Securities Exchange Act.14 0 Unsurprisingly, shortly
after Apple issued a press release "stating that its
management had discovered irregularities regarding the
issuance of certain stock option grants," the company's
shareholders brought a derivative action.141 A settlement
agreement was subsequently approved, and it was deemed
fair and reasonable in light of the requirement that Apple
"adopt multiple corporate governance reforms."142  Notably,
no actions were brought against the Chief Executive Officer,
Steve Jobs. 14 3
The Brocade and Apple investigations are examples of
the SEC's attempt to quell backdating.14 4  At the time,
however, critics questioned the SEC's "ability to both
adequately and comprehensively undertake the probes," given
the decline in the SEC's enforcement resources. 145
G. Backdating Activity Still Persists Today
In the wake of the scandal, backdating was at the core of
most SEC investigations.146 More recently, however, the SEC
has turned its focus elsewhere, allowing unreported
backdating to continue unhindered.147 The SEC believed that
its message had been received by companies and executives
and, therefore, turned its attention to other matters.14 8
Contrary to the SEC's opinion, a study released in 2009
claimed that most "companies that improperly backdated
stock options never were caught by regulators or [did not]
confess[] to the practice" through proper disclosure or
restatement.14 9  The study implied that backdating was
prevalent in many companies that were not subject to
140. Litigation Release No. 20086, supra note 135.
141. In re Apple Computer, Inc. Derivative Litigation, No. C 06-4128 JF,
2008 WL 4820784, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008).
142. Id. at *2.
143. Tom Krazit, Report: Apple's Jobs Maintained Stock-Option Ignorance,
CNET NEWS (Apr. 23, 2009), http-/news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-10225934-
37.html (reporting that Steve Jobs claimed to be unaware of the accounting
implications of backdating).
144. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 2-3.
145. Id. at 21.
146. See Maremont, supra note 9.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
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investigations, including Omnicom Group, Inc. (an
advertising company), The Dress Barn, Inc., J.B. Hunt
Transport Services, Inc., and United Rentals, Inc.150  This
study not only suggested that the practice might have been
more widespread than initially believed, but also undermined
the theory that the scandal was primarily limited to the
technology sector. 151
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO
THE SCANDAL
Despite passing new regulations, and despite the
governmental initiation of investigations in response to the
scandal, backdating has not been eliminated.'5 2 Even though
the "SEC's new backdating disclosure requirements represent
an admirable attempt at quelling the backdating controversy,
it is unlikely that the executive compensation disclosure rules
will impose any new requirements for backdated options that
were not already in place under existing federal securities
laws."' 5 ' Rather than instituting a blanket prohibition of
such practices, the new rules merely reinforce existing laws
that already mandated the disclosure of backdated options.' 5 4
Consequently, "the SEC appears to have at least tacitly
accepted the legitimacy" of backdating. 5 5  In addition, the
SEC lacks sufficient resources to enforce the new regulations
and fully investigate every case of suspected backdating.5 I
The current regulations do not act as a sufficient
deterrent to eradicate the problem, and while backdating may
benefit the recipients of the grants, the costs are being carried
by the stockholders.' The backdating activity that
continues undeterred by current regulatory and investigatory
mechanisms is harmful to these stockholders. An undisclosed
backdated option results in understated compensation
expense and overstated earnings per share on the income
statement. 158 In turn, this leads to reduced shareholder value
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra Part II.D-E.
153. Shipman, supra note 6, at 1223.
154. Id. at 1197-98.
155. Id.
156. See BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 20-21.
157. Id. at 9.
158. TIMING OF STOCK OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 1.
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and an increased risk of costly restatements or litigation. 5 9
Therefore, the current regulations and ernforcement
strategies "fail to demonstrate a concerted commitment. .. to
protect shareholders" from undisclosed backdating. 160
Academics have suggested that the solution is to require
heightened regulation and an enhanced enforcement effort on
the part of the SEC.'6 1 On the other hand, public fear of
increased regulation and a lack of available SEC resources for
enforcement measures suggest that the solution is not so
straightforward.16 2
IV. ANALYZING THE BACKDATING PROBLEM
The problem with unreported stock option backdating is
multi-facetted.163 First, many public companies have escaped
notice under current rules that do not sufficiently deter the
undisclosed backdating of stock options.'6" Second, there are
insufficient government resources available to enforce the
current regulations or to investigate every public company
that has potentially backdated.'6 ' Third, there are very few
disclosure mechanisms in place for private companies that
could trigger investigations or stockholder actions.'6 6 Fourth,
the corporate gatekeepers, such as lawyers and accountants,
are immune from liability.167 And finally, any new regulation
will probably be opposed by the pro-laissez-faire members of
the public. 168
159. Id.
160. Shipman, supra note 6, at 1223.
161. See, e.g., Heron & Lie 2007, supra note 87, at 294.
162. See generally infra Part IV.
163. See id.
164. See Maremont, supra note 9.
165. See BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 20-21.
166. See infra Part IV.B.
167. See Ameet Sachdev, Should Lawyers be Held More Accountable
in Securities Fraud?, CI. TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2009),
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/chicago-law/2009/08/should-lawyers-be-
held-more-accountable-in-securities-fraud.html.
168. Esteban Tamayo Zea, Regulation in Financial Markets
Today, THINKING ECON (May 11, 2008, 9:35 AM),
http://thinkingecon.blogspot.com/2008_05-01-archive.html (discussing the
disastrous effects of an unregulated market).
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A. The Public Sector Regulation Is Deficient
Despite the rules and regulations that are in place, and
the investigations that were initiated, many public companies
still escaped notice; there may be many more companies that
still have not, and may never be, subject to investigation. 6 9
Furthermore, a 2009 study indicated that the problem is now
much more geographically expansive, and that the activity is
not just popular within technology concentrated locations,
such as Silicon Valley. 70 In addition, the government's focus
on the technology sector does not seem to have deterred
companies in other sectors. 7'
In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley substantially curtailed the
activity of undisclosed backdating by amending the deadline
for executives to report grants to the SEC on a Form 4 filing.
This curtailment gave "some SEC officials a sense that the
abuse [was] largely a thing of the past."7 2  The reform
removed, or at least reduced, the opportunity for public
companies to "review their earlier stock price performance,
identify the low point, and retroactively designate that date
as the stock option grant date."'7 3 It appears, however, that
many companies failed to comply with this deadline.'74
Studies conducted in 2005 showed that roughly thirteen
percent of the insider option grant award filings were late.'s
One explanation for this high number of late filings may be
that "enforcement against late filers" has traditionally been
considered a "low priority area" so there is a minimal
compliance incentive." Another explanation is that
"continued and widespread backdating," albeit reduced, still
exists.' 7 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, if a company files a late
Form 4, it must disclose the late filing in a proxy statement
169. See generally Maremont, supra note 9.
170. See id. (noting that it is highly likely that companies outside of the
technology field have backdated, including Dress Barn).
171. See id.
172. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 14, 22. Another factor that
reduced backdating was the "end of the bull market that began in the 1990s."
Id. at 22.
173. Id. at 14.
174. Id.
175. Heron & Lie 2007, supra note 87, at 292-93.
176. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 23.
177. Id. at 22.
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and on its annual report.1 78  Even with these penalties in
place, however, late filings have not been eliminated. '7
Thus, if the filings are late because late filings provide
companies with greater opportunities to backdate stock
options, then Sarbanes-Oxley does not appear to have
deterred this behavior. 18 0
In 2006, there were an estimated two thousand
companies suspected of some sort of manipulation
practices."' But only a "modest portion of [those] companies"
are likely to ever be investigated by the SEC, because of the
enormous resources required to uncover more than
circumstantial evidence of the backdating.182  The SEC has
acknowledged that due to limited resources, pursuing more
companies suspected of undisclosed backdating would be at
the expense of enforcement in other areas.1 83 These economic
restraints, coupled with the lack of enforcement of filing
deadlines, provide "greater opportunities for backdating,"
lower the deterrent effect, and increase the chance that firms
may intentionally backdate.184
In addition, the new executive compensation disclosure
requirements do not add anything novel to the existing
reporting obligations that existed previously; the old rules are
merely restated. 85 Instead, the SEC failed to take a position
on the practice, and as a consequence, it "appears to have
given its tacit acceptance" of backdating. 86  This omission
may be a result of the lack of a consensus within the SEC
regarding the legality of the practice.'8 7 But even though this
lack of consensus may mean that the current regulations and
investigations have not added anything to previous
178. Significant Changes in What and When Insiders Need to Report
Under Section 16(A) of the '34 Act, NEWSLETIER (Levett
Rockwood P.C., Westport, Conn.), Oct. 2002, at 2, available at
http://www.levettrockwood.com/00129012.pdf. The late filing also gives the
"SEC broad authority to seek any equitable relief it finds appropriate or
necessary to benefit investors for any violations of the new ... deadline." Id.
179. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 22.
180. See id.
181. Heron & Lie, supra note 59, at 5.
182. Id.
183. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 20-21.
184. Id. at 24.
185. Shipman, supra note 6, at 1211.
186. Id. at 1215.
187. Id.
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regulations, there are positive consequences that may arise
out of the increased awareness regarding backdating.'s In
this regard, Professor Erik Lie stated that the media focus
alone may be enough to substantially curtail backdating
because executives are beginning to recognize that they will
not get away with it anymore. 8 9
B. The Private Sector Regulation Is Deficient
In the private sector, not only is it harder to determine
the actual fair market value of the stock prior to a grant, but
it is also harder for the government to enforce the disclosure
of a backdated grant because private companies have fewer
reporting obligations.'s Stock pricing in a private company is
complicated and is usually a costly endeavor.19' A private
company must either hire an independent appraiser, who will
value the stock based on performance and prospects, or the
company must negotiate a deal and see how much people are
willing to pay for the stock.192 By contrast, the stock price of
a public company is driven by the market and can be
ascertained within seconds on the internet or in a
newspaper. 9 3
Regardless of how a private company chooses to value its
stock, it is still subject to the generally accepted accounting
principles governing the disclosure of expenses related to
compensation.'94 The directors and officers of private
companies must also ensure that their actions do not breach
their fiduciary duties and trigger a shareholder action.'
188. Id. at 1217 (stating that the new disclosure rules are "a step in the right
direction, if for no other reason than the increased awareness of backdating
practices that accompanied the passage of the new disclosure rules").
189. See Kathleen Pender, Stricter Rules on Compensation Disclosure
Adopted, S.F. CHRON., July 27, 2006, at C1, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/ca/2006/07/27/BUGK4K61N51.DTL
(discussing the positive responses to the new disclosure rules).
190. See infra text accompanying notes 191-205.
191. Fraser, supra note 37.
192. Id. This means that the value over time can be compared from year to
year. Id. Without this independent valuation, the stock price tends to reflect
the purpose for which the valuation was conducted. Id. For example, if the
"owner is selling part or all of a company . .. obtaining the highest price is
desirable." Id. If the owner will be subject to tax liability, the lowest price is
desirable. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Ulmer Berne, supra note 37, at 2.
195. See Narayanan et al., supra note 63, at 1615-16.
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Furthermore, private companies are bound by the provisions
of the tax code, including the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code section 409A, which requires stock to be
granted at fair value."' Therefore, despite the difficulties in
determining the fair market value of a private company's
stock, these companies still run the risk of penalties if stock
options are backdated and thus granted below fair value.'9 7
Although section 409A provides a huge disincentive to
backdating, it does not prevent it completely.'9 8
A specific issue for private sector regulation is that there
are fewer means available for discovering backdating
activity.'99 The SEC has limited resources to investigate the
backdating issue and, as it has already been noted, the initial
inquiry into public companies was spawned by Erik Lie's
study.200 Lie's studies were based on information obtained
from public disclosures made in documents that public
companies are required to make readily available.2 0' Thus
far, the government's regulatory responses and guidelines
have only affected public companies.2 02 Because private
companies are not required to make similar public disclosures
in compliance with federal securities law and regulations,2 0 3
and since the SEC does not have the resources to investigate
further,20 4 this might explain why private companies have
remained out of the spotlight.205
196. See Ulmer Berne, supra note 37, at 2.
197. See id.; see also Fraser, supra note 37.
198. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 13 (highlighting that the
consequence of backdating or issuing options below fair value is a reduction in
the tax advantage normally applicable to options granted at fair value).
199. See Ulmer Berne, supra note 37, at 1 (noting that private companies
have been almost immune until now).
200. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 23.
201. See generally Lie, supra note 52.
202. See supra Part II.E (discussing the public company compensation
disclosure requirements enacted in 2006 and the recommendations made by the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).
203. Cf Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13-15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78o
(2009) (setting forth the reporting obligations that apply only to public
companies).
204. See BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 20-23.
205. See Ulmer Berne, supra note 37, at 1.
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C. The Corporate Gatekeepers Should Not be Immune from
Liability to Shareholders
Currently, the law provides immunity to professionals,
such as lawyers and accountants, from certain shareholder
actions.2 06  Under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, it is fraudulent for any person to "make any untrue
statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."2 07  "[T]he fact that a
backdated option allows a company's executive to enjoy an
undisclosed financial windfall-while causing shareholders to
incur an unintended compensation expense"-is highly likely
to be considered a material fact that should be publicly
disclosed under section 10(b).2 0 8 Nevertheless, professionals
are insulated from civil liability where they have assisted a
client who has committed such a fraud because the implied
private right of action for securities fraud under section 10(b)
does not extend to aiders and abettors.2 09 This is true even if
the professional drafts or prepares documents or disclosure
statements that contain false statements on behalf of a client.
These false statements are attributable to the client, not the
professional, and the professional's actions amount to nothing
more than aiding or abetting.210
This civil immunity promotes passivity on the part of
lawyers and accountants, and also creates a major gap in
enforcement because these individuals are the people that the
investing public relies on to review the merits of the
statements and transactions.2 1 ' In the past, when liability
has been imposed directly on professionals, it has promoted
diligence on their part and has reduced the harm sought to be
206. Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411,
426-29 (2008).
207. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2007).
208. Shipman, supra note 6, at 1212.
209. Kim, supra note 206, at 426-27, 428 n.82. This principle was even
applied in the Enron case where lawyers helped the company "to hide billions of
dollars of losses from investors and thus artificially inflated its earnings" and
stock price. Brent J. Horton, How Corporate Lawyers Escape Sarbanes-Oxley:
Disparate Treatment in the Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2008).
210. See Sachdev, supra note 167. Nevertheless, the accounting profession
still faces primary liability for the certification of a client's financial statements
and, therefore, is slightly less insulated than the legal profession. Kim, supra
note 206, at 426-27.
211. See Sachdev, supra note 167.
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eliminated.212 There is speculation that accounting firms may
have played roles in the backdating, but so far they have not
been "implicated for their roles."2 13 Therefore, the lack of
regulation or the availability of a cause of action in this area
may be perpetuating the problem.2 14
For example, Brocade's CEO claimed that the company's
outside counsel, Larry Sonsini, was aware of the backdated
and undisclosed option grants, and that he approved the
activity.2 15 Yet, Sonsini was not penalized for failing to
recommend disclosure or to alert authorities.2 16 Furthermore,
the lawyers working under Sonsini did not notice, or did not
report, the sloppy granting techniques utilized at Brocade.2 17
This level of passivity on the part of outside counsel might be
due to the current immunity from liability.2 18
D. Costs of Regulation Do Not Outweigh Benefits
While it is nearly "universally agreed that backdating is
no longer the kind of problem that it was several years ago,"
it has not been eliminated and further regulation may be
required.219 The main problem with tightening regulations is
that it imposes a huge burden on small businesses and
venture capital because it results in heightened overhead
costs.22 0 These costs are not just costs of business that have
to be passed along, but they also deprive smaller companies of
the chance to become more competitive in the global
market.2 2 1 More specifically, additional regulations may have
212. See, e.g., Michael J. Halloran, Greater Use of SEC Enforcement Tools
Against Accounting Firms Has Important Consequences for Companies,
FINDLAw (Sep. 13, 2002), httpJ//ibrary.findlaw.com/2002/Sep/13/132455.html
(discussing the corporate governance benefits that were derived from § 10A of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that imposed obligations on accounting
firms to report illegal acts).
213. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 19. See Peter Burrows & Robert
D. Hoff, Sonsini Under Scrutiny, BusiNEss WEEK (Oct. 2, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_40/b4003056.htm.
214. See Sachdev, supra note 167.
215. Burrows & Hoff, supra note 213.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Sachdev, supra note 167.
219. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 24.
220. Karen Kerrigan & Joel Jameson, Op-Ed., New Options-Reporting Rules
Would Strain Small Companies, THE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 6, 2006, available
at http://www.meridian-hill.com/cs-files/profile/merc-news.pdf.
221. See id.
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a negative impact on the technology sector, because they may
deter successful companies that do not want to change their
compensation models from entering the public sector.2 22
Moreover, there is an argument that backdating was
previously a gray area, but now that everyone is aware of the
problem. as a result of the developments since 2005, it will
disappear naturally without need for heightened
regulation.223 Even though most lawyers and accountants
were previously unaware of the implications of backdating,
and did not condemn it or proactively recommend disclosure
by clients, most would likely take a pro-disclosure stance
today.224 Any board member or in-house counsel who has
gone through one backdating investigation will not want to go
through the ordeal again.22 5 Thus, even without regulation,
the same result could be achieved "if innovators continue to
innovate, but everyone gains a stronger sense of the value of
governance and boards."226
A study released in 2009, however, concluded that the
new compensation disclosure requirements and SEC
backdating investigations are not proving to be a deterrent
and have not led to a change in corporate behavior or
enhanced disclosures.227 The study suggested that nearly
two-thirds of the companies suspected of backdating were not
investigated and the backdating behavior still remains
undisclosed.228 Investors have witnessed successful results
from technology leaders who "behave outside the box,"22 9 and
despite the release of this new study in 2009, investors have
not responded negatively.23 0 Perhaps this lack of response
222. See Mader, supra note 42.
223. Peter Burrows, Greg Reyes Exonerated On Option Backdating. Why
That's A Good Thing., BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/the-thread/techbeatlarchives/2009/08/greg-reyes
exon.html.
224. See id.
225. See Mader, supra note 42.
226. See id.
227. See generally Maremont, supra note 9.
228. Id.
229. See Mader, supra note 42.
230. Megan Barnett, Investors Respond to Backdating 2.0 with
Resounding "Who Cares?", MINYANVILLE (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.minyanville.com/articles/options-backdatinglindex/a/24116 (noting
that the publication of these studies showing that companies like Dress Barn
are still allegedly backdating did not affect their performance on the stock
market. Instead, Barnett observes that after the announcement, Dress Barn's
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reflects a new shareholder outlook: "if [companies] are smart
enough to reward [their] best people and not get caught,
[they] must be doing something right."2 1' Alternatively, the
SEC and shareholders may simply have more pressing
concerns to respond to in light of the current economic
situation.23 2 Indeed, even after the initial round of
backdating discoveries, most investors indicated that they
were far more concerned with a company's financial
performance than with allegations of stock option
backdating.2 33
Nevertheless, courts still believe that failure to disclose
backdating is a material omission, and that investors should
be informed of the additional compensation expense.2 34
Furthermore, despite the free marketers' opposition to
government intervention, the new regulations introduced in
the past few years might actually produce better results than
a laissez faire approach.235 The current laws provide for
enhanced disclosure that allows directors and shareholders to
make fully informed compensation decisions, but the laws do
not intervene to the extent of regulating the level or method
of compensation that a company may provide to its
employees.2 36 Achieving this balance is important because
opponents of regulation argue that Americans are strongly
opposed to it, but at the same time, the proponents believe
that without regulation, Americans will allow themselves to
be swindled. As it stands, "it will be up to shareholders,
directors, investors and the market to decide how they will
use this improved disclosure," but improved levels of
market price rose.).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Mader, supra note 42.
234. S.E.C. v. Reyes, 491 F. Supp. 2d 906, 914-15 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
that nondisclosure of compensation was a material omission because such
expenses are important to investors, but not opining with regards to the legality
or materiality of backdating itself).
235. See Zea, supra note 168.
236. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
Introductory Remarks at the SEC Open Meeting (July 26, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch072606cc.htm (noting that the
regulations do not specify a level of compensation).
237. Guy Bennett, Deregulation to Blame for Madoff Fiasco, MINYANVILLE
(Dec. 16, 2008), http//www.minyanville.com/articles/nasdaq-HBC-economy--
mortgage-index/a/20350/p/1 (blaming the consequences of the Madoff scandal
on deregulation).
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disclosure will almost certainly benefit the economy because
investors will have better tools to monitor their
investments.2 38 It seems only fair that public shareholders,
the owners of the corporation, "have a window into the
compensation decisions made by the boards . .. that represent
their interests."239
V. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE NOVEL MEASURES
More government intervention and enforcement is
needed because the current mechanisms have not eliminated
the problems associated with backdating. As mentioned
above, the post-scandal-discovery government amendments
did not add anything new to the pre-discovery regulations.
And although awareness of the problem was increased, it did
not disappear. To solve the problem, a new regulatory
approach is required that will deter non-compliance in a
manner that is not so intrusive that the public will oppose it.
The regulations must take the ease of implementation and
cost of government enforcement into consideration. Even if
the new regulations do nothing more than increase public
awareness of the problems associated with undisclosed
backdating, they will be effective because they will force the
actors to be more critical of practices and to self-regulate.2 4 0
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission Should Require
Fixed Grant Dates For Public Companies
One way for public companies to avoid the temptation of
backdating, or suspicion thereof, is to pre-determine fixed and
regular grant dates each year. This would give executives
fewer opportunities to manipulate these dates.2 4 '
Furthermore, this would draw attention to any grants made
on different dates and could limit the scope of investigations.
Fixed grant dates will not necessarily prevent the grant dates
from being backdated to a previous set grant date that fell at
a time when the fair value was lower, but this could severely
238. See Cox, supra note 236.
239. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks
at the SEC Open Meeting (July 26, 2006), available at
http//www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch072606psa.htm.
240. See Heron & Lie, supra note 59, at 7.
241. Also, Erik Lie's study showed that the backdating pattern was largely
absent for grants that appeared to be scheduled in advance. See id. at 3-4.
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reduce the activity.
The removal of a company's flexibility to make
unexpected and urgent grants on dates that are not pre-fixed
is open to criticism.2 42 Therefore, this proposal should be
coupled with an alternative option that allows for
unscheduled grants to executives, if these grants are reported
within twenty-four hours of the grant date instead of the
current forty-eight hour deadline set in the Securities
Exchange Act, as amended by Sarbanes-Oxey.24 3 This
twenty-four hour reporting requirement should not be seen as
a limitation, because if the grant is so urgent that it cannot
wait until the next scheduled grant date, then the burden of
meeting the twenty-four hour filing requirement should seem
negligible. Furthermore, in the limited situations where a
grant is unexpected and urgent, filing within twenty-four
hours should not be problematic, given the simplicity of the
electronic filing system. In addition, many companies already
report grants within this time frame without problems.2 "
While the administrative and compliance costs may seem
significant, the benefits to be derived from this option should
be weighed against these costs. In most cases, it is likely that
the benefits will far outweigh the costs, given the likelihood of
reduced compensation expense, increased shareholder value,
and a reduction in the risk of having to restate financials or
litigate the issue.2 45 With this option in effect, backdated
options will be more likely to stand out, enabling the SEC to
focus its enforcement mechanisms in the right places.24 6
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission Should
Heighten Third Party Obligations
Another approach would be to allow investors to bring
suit against the third parties that indirectly aided or abetted
in the undisclosed backdating by turning a blind eye to the
activity and not questioning, or even encouraging,
nondisclosure. Under this alternative approach, the third
parties could be required to include a representation in their
242. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 25.
243. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. 78 p (2009).
244. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 24.
245. See TIMING OF STOCK OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 1.
246. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 24 (describing the current
enforcement mechanism as a "low payoff exercise").
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opinions delivered to shareholders (such as legal opinions or
financial statement certifications) that the corporate records
have been reviewed and that no undisclosed backdated
options were found. Consequently, lawyers and accountants
would likely monitor their clients' granting patterns more
closely in an attempt to avoid personal liability to
stockholders.247 When lawyers and accountants are aware
that public disclosures are false or misleading, they should
not escape liability just because their acts are classified as
aiding or abetting, as opposed to constituting a primary
violation.24 8 Even though accountants, lawyers, and other
professionals are not actively encouraging misstatements, or
are not necessarily even aware of them, investors and
regulators rely on professionals to review the transactions
and promote full and fair disclosure.24 9
Allowing investors to sue the third party professionals
that aid in the undisclosed granting of stock options will have
many beneficial results. First, allowing suits against lawyers
and accountants, or requiring them to make additional
representations, would encourage diligence on the part of
these individuals.2 50 Second, this increased level of diligence
will consequently lead to an enhanced awareness of the
problems associated with backdating. Third, to avoid
liability, the third parties are likely to recommend heightened
internal controls to their corporate clients. These
recommendations will boost investor confidence in the
market. 2 5 ' Fourth, this solution is consistent with the SEC's
commitment to pursuing "not just those who perpetrate
financial fraud, but the corporate gatekeepers who allow it to
happen on their watch." 25 2 Fifth, shareholders are unlikely to
oppose any additional costs that arise as a result of the extra
liability third parties are encountering, because it benefits
247. See Sachdev, supra note 167.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Halloran, supra note 212.
251. See Lucci, supra note 86 (discussing the impact of the heightened
controls required by Sarbanes-Oxley). It should also be noted that companies
with heightened internal controls are generally less likely to file a late Form 4.
See BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 23.
252. Press Release, supra note 132 (quoting Linda Chatman Thomsen, the
SEC's Director of Enforcement).
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them in the long run.253  Finally, this solution would help
circumvent the SEC resource issues because the third parties
would be assisting the SEC in its initial stages of its
investigations. In particular, this solution could prove
extremely effective in the private sector, where the public
does not have access to the financials to investigate the issue
themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stock options are a useful compensation tool that can
provide huge incentives to employees, such as the opportunity
to share in the employer's profits.5  Companies, however,
are tempted to abuse stock options by manipulating grant
dates to provide the maximum incentives to employees while
minimizing the cost to the company. 255 As the law currently
stands, so long as backdating is disclosed, it is not illegal.2 56
Nevertheless, many backdated options still remain
undisclosed, potentially causing extreme harm to
shareholders .2  The current regulations have curtailed the
problem, but they have not eliminated it completely.25 8 This
is primarily because some companies are undeterred by the
regulations and the SEC is unable to take enforcement action
against more than a fraction of the companies that have
backdated.259 Although there is a need for heightened
regulation, it is unlikely that it will be enacted without
opposition from those who fear excessive government
intervention. 2 60  Furthermore, if the SEC cannot afford to
enforce the current laws, then the new regulations will be
unsuccessful.2 6 1
The objectives highlighted in this comment can be
achieved by requiring fixed grant dates and by increasing
obligations on the part of lawyers and accountants. The
proposals set forth in this comment help to bridge the gap
253. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the benefits that could be derived from
additional regulation).
254. See BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 1.
255. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 47.
256. Id. at 48.
257. See Maremont, supra note 9.
258. Heron & Lie 2007, supra note 87, at 294.
259. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 20-21.
260. See Zea, supra note 168.
261. See Heron & Lie 2007, supra note 87, at 294.
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between suspicions of backdating, and actual investigation
and enforcement.2 62 The proposed regulations will
significantly increase awareness of the backdating problem.
In turn, heightened awareness will lead to both self-
regulation on the part of the companies and to a promotion of
critical practices on the part of lawyers and accountants.6 3
Finally, the benefits that the stockholders will reap from
access to accurate disclosures, as well as stock values that
reflect public confidence in companies with strong internal
controls, should quell any opposition to this minimal level of
government intervention.26
262. BICKLEY & SHORTER, supra note 2, at 20-21.
263. See Heron & Lie, supra note 59, at 7.
264. See Bennett, supra note 237 (discussing the benefits of regulation);
Lucci, supra note 86 (concluding that strong internal controls boost the public's
confidence in the market).
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